ABSTRACT
Nigerian paramilitary headquarters have, in the recent years faced multiple challenges as far as their home security is concerned. Several attacks by aggressors have been reported through media and eyewitnesses. This has proven that the building designs and spatial organization of the headquarters are vulnerable and penetrable and therefore need security enhancement. However, there has not been any comprehensive research to show that new security measures through spatial design, unique to paramilitary buildings have been introduced. For that reason, this study endeavours to fill in that research gap; the aim been to enhance security responsiveness in the design of paramilitary headquarters by ensuring apposite spatial organization. To bring this to fruition, survey method was adopted. Since considerable amount of relevant information about individual experiences of others is required, structured interview and visual survey were used as instruments of data collection. To narrow down the scope, case studies on three paramilitary institutions were carried out, namely; the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Nigeria Immigrations Service (NIS), and the Nigeria Customs Services (NCS). In order to collect data, stratified and subsequently purposive samplings were used in selecting the respondents. A total of six interviewees per institution were selected; out of which eleven (61.11%) were successful with an average interview duration of one hour. Comparative analyses of the three institutions were later carried out then were deliberated under some key physical security variables and checklist. Thereafter, the following findings were discovered: i) most paramilitary buildings are designed without in-depth acquaintance with security guide lines. This is because no written document for guidance on security issues for the planning, design, and construction of paramilitary installations to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks exist. Hence, their studies are said to be horizontal rather than vertical. ii) Some paramilitary buildings are only protected by adopting fire brigade security vii measures. iii) The overall and primary focus of paramilitary personnel revolve around the following; Access control, parking, standoff distance and unobstructed space. iv) There exists often, insufficient site space for adopting some security standards. It was understood that a typical paramilitary setting demands very elaborate site to sufficiently gulp the features of a security responsive environment. v) Materials used are not blast resistant thus leaving the building vulnerable to attack. vi) In most cases, designers do not study and understand crime, criminals and criminal behaviour and how they operate before they set off. vii) Site selection is sometimes poor. Topography is not relatively flat. As such, the building envelope and site configuration can be easily monitored from afar without much stress. viii) Building materials used mostly require maintenance within a short period of time; hence it leads to frequent ingress and egress of maintenance companies which could be potential threats to building. In contribution to knowledge, this research has outlined various drawbacks associated with paramilitary headquarters' design and has proffered to them, possible solutions that have been showcased in the archetype design of a police zonal headquarters linked to this research. As a final note, findings from this research recommends that the ministry of police affairs in conjunction with the ministry of finance and interior ministry as well as all stakeholders should as a matter of urgency adopt the aforementioned findings as a tool for standardizing all future paramilitary headquarters designs.
